J. Gou, X. Cai, S. Dou
This study focuses on “Chinese style road crossing” and aims at investigating changes in the number of pedestrians who cross the road in the “Chinese way”, in order to discover the evolution of laws and behavior of influential factors. The pedestrian crossing behavior without supervision model was established for analysis, and the profit matrix is acquired by intercepting the scene of “Chinese style road crossing”. The influence of a variety of decision-making parameters on evolution is discussed. Furthermore, the effect of a variety of revenues and loss of ordinary pedestrians and adventure illegal pedestrians, and the effect of changes in the initial condition on evolution results are shown by numerical simulation. It was found that “Chinese style road crossing” may not only evolve into a good state, but also evolve into a bad state; which forms a “lock in”. The convergence state of this behavior is dependent on the relative payment of various tactics between ordinary pedestrians and adventure illegal pedestrians. Evolutionary routes for “Chinese style road crossing” could be optimized and guide adventure illegal behaviors, in order to establish a good direction.
Keywords: Chinese style road crossing; pedestrian crossing; evolutionary game theory; behavioral evolution