Three-party evolutionary game analysis and optimization of cooperative strategies in road-rail intermodal transport with non-vehicle carriers

Public-rail intermodal transport plays a strategic role in optimizing transportation structures but faces inefficiencies arising from the monopolistic position of railway enterprises and the market-driven demands of road transport enterprises. Non-vehicle carriers, acting as intermediaries, struggle to integrate resources effectively due to asymmetric information, leading road transport companies toward speculative behaviors that compromise overall efficiency. This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model comprising non-vehicle carriers, road transport enterprises, and railway transport enterprises to explore strategic interactions and equilibrium states in intermodal transportation. Using replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix stability analysis, this study identifies evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) under various cooperative scenarios. Numerical simulations further illustrate strategy evolution dynamics, highlighting the critical role of railway information sharing, regulatory efficiency, and penalties in achieving optimal cooperation. Findings suggest that proactive information sharing and coordinated oversight significantly enhance intermodal transport efficiency, while inadequate regulation exacerbates speculative behaviors. Recommendations include enhancing collaborative information mechanisms, improving service standards in road transport enterprises, and advancing transport standardization to promote sustainable, efficient public-rail intermodal systems.